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Literature in the sociology of law has been increasing but, as
yet, this growth has been accompanied by few theoretical
assessments of the field or the state of knowledge which has been
produced.! This paper will be concerned with such an assessment.
In particular, I am interested in delineating the theoretical
underpinnings of the sociology of law as exhibited in the works of
sociologists and sociological jurisprudents. From such a review I
will demonstrate the linkage between particular theoretical
assumptions about the world and the laws place in it, and present
day research. Finally, in commenting upon one theme in current
research, I hope to indicate the extent to which its limitations are
a function of a particular world view and to suggest a different set
of theoretical assumptions which would lead to markedly different
research endeavors. In sum, I will be concerned with the
relationship between theory and research and the limitations
imposed by particular theories in the sociology of law today.
THE IMPORTANCE OF THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS
An acceptance of the necessity of law is" a primary
characteristic of theories in the sociology of law. Theorists who
have written in this area have tended to perceive the lawas a
necessary and positive ingredient .in the maintenance of social
order and the attainment of progress and, consequently"; .have
taken the present system of law for granted.
Where deficiencies or inequities in the law are noted, they
have been deemed amenable to scientific knowledge and expertise.
Researchers in law have invoked scientific procedures as the basis
*1 would like to thank Neal Shover for many helpful comments and criticisms.
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upon which remedies should rest. They have insisted that theories
be tested-that important concepts be operationalized and
submitted to the "strict" canons of empirical verification before
changes in the law are made. However, despite this emphasis on
research, theories and research on law have been unable to account
for hostility directed against law or for the failure of scientific
remedies to be instituted or to work as planned once they are
accepted.
The reasons for such failure may be seen in the assumptions
of the theories as well as in the beliefs of both theorists and
researchers that scientific social engineering is dependent only
upon the operationalization of concepts and the accumlation of
knowledge, and that these can exist apart from, or remain
uninfluenced by, assumptions about the world.
It is necessary to recognize that theories are not objective
pronouncements generated by a disinterested, objective assessment
of the world. Instead, theories are generated by tensions in the
theorist's personal world which he feels must be assuaged; intuitive
hunches, which are rarely explicated and even less often subject to
verification, provide the basis upon which theories are constructed
(Gouldner, 1970; Phillips, 1974).
of course, while theory may be generated by personal
experiences, such experiences as well as interpretations of them,
are not merely the result of individual idiosyncracies. For
example, members of particular strata tend to have in common
their socialization patterns as well as life experiences. Such
commonalities are further augmented by membership in a
'professional group and belief in a professional ideology (Mills,
1941; Snodgrass, 1972).
The theorists to· be discussed had much in ·common. They
were reared in professional, economically comfortable homes, and
received university and legal training at a time when few were so
educated. One can suppose that the world which they experienced
was generally placid, orderly and personally satisfying.2 As such, it
is not surprising to find, among sociologists and sociological
jurisprudents, common assumptions about the law which reflect
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the conditions of their lives. The question then, in analyzing their
theories, is not how true they are but rather what the theory
reveals about a particular world view and the extent to which the
theorist's assumptions precluded alternative explanatory schemes.
Thus, in the following analysis, we will be interested in the ways in
which the assumptions which legal theorists held about the world
may have precluded more accurate explanations of the workings
of the world.
SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE
Two of the first legal theorists to advance a sociological
approach to the study of law were Eugen Ehrlich and Roscoe
Pound. The origins of the field have been traced to their work
(e.g., Schur, 1968), and their assumptions continue to be reflected
in current research and writing in this area.
As will be seen, the characteristics which mark their approach
include an assumption of pluralism, a reification of the law, the
postulation of a necessary congruence between the law and the
attitudes and values of the corresponding populace, and a cautious
approach to instituting legal change. This caution, it should be
noted, was predicated on their belief that scientific research was
eminently suited and needed to direct such change.
EHRLICH
Eugen Ehrlich is generally recognized as the founder of
sociological jurisprudence, Responding -to the shortcomings of
analytical and historical jurisprudence, he stressed the necessity
for studies of the law to be situated within a societal context. This
directive was premised upon Ehrlich's postulation of a living
law-"the law which dominated life itself"-which had "existed in
social associations prior to the development of state law and
which, in fact, served as its basis. As he saw it:
The human relations upon which a presentation of the law must be
based, are independent of the legal propositions.... The various
legal propositions as such ... have no information to convey. If
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there is a unifying regularity in the phenomena of legal life, to
discover and make a presentation of which is the function of
sociology, it can be found only in the fact that legal life is
conditioned upon the social and economic constitution (Ehrlich,
1936:475-477).
But, Ehrlich recognized that the relationship between the living
law and the statutes was not always easily seen or understood.
Thus, the sociology of law was to be concerned with the manner
in which the "ends may be attained that men are endeavoring to
attain through law" (Ehrlich, 1936:202).
Asserting that the sociology of law should trace the
relationship between the positive and the living law, Ehrlich laid
down a method by which to do so. He stated:
There is no other means (to facilitate such understanding) but to
open one's eyes, to inform oneself by observing life attentively, to
ask people and to note down their replies (Ehrlich, 1936:498).
While comments upon such methodological directives are not in
order now, it should be noted that between opening one's eyes
and understanding comes a long process of interpretation and that
this process is mediated, as least in part, by one's position in the
social hierarchy. The faith which Ehrlich and those who have
followed him have placed in science and careful measurement is
based upon faith and this cannot be forgotten if one is to
understand the limitations of Ehrlich's methodological directives
as "well as.the limitations of the studies which have attended them.
"Thus; in analyzing assumptions we are not limited only to those'
regarding the nature of law and society. We are also interested in
showing the ways in which belief in the scientific study of the law
as the basis for, and initiator of, legal change has been misguided.
Ehrlich's view of the state in the creation of law is essentially
non-coercive; it is bolstered by his assumption that the actions of
the state- are predicated upon the needs and will of the people and
that the efficacy of the law is dependent upon its correspondence
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with the majorities "inner impulses." Thus, Ehrlich is not troubled
by the state's increasing role in the administration and creation of
law because the state is seen as merely reflecting the proclivities of
its citizenry.
While Ehrlich touches on differential participation in the
development of law his assumptions about the necessary
correspondence between law and general interest keep him from
pursuing the implications of such participation. In his discussion
of legal history he states:
Those persons who master the learning of decisions achieve a great
influence in the development of the law; they become jurists who,
occasionally as judges but more often as writers of opinions and
counselors determine the course of decisions (Ehrlich, 1922:134).
Only in a world where power is viewed benignly and is not
associated with force or coercion can one rest content with such a
statement. One who eschews the assumption of general interests
which are naturally or neutrally determined and then reflected in
law is prompted to inquire which members of society master the
learning of decisions, whether those who achieve great influence
are members of a particular strata, and of course, the paramount
question, the degree and extent of their influence. As we have
seen, the fact that these questions remain unanswered tells us
more about Ehrlich's assumptions about the world than it does
about the importance of such concerns.
POUND
While Ehrlich delineated the foundations of what was to
become sociological jurisprudence Pound was its major architect
and through his voluminous writings did the most to establish its
legitimacy as a school of legal philosophy. It should be noted too
that, while Pound and Ehrlich shared fundamental assumptions
about the nature of law, Pound's assumptions were somewhat
more complex in that he, at least, recognized the competing
interests with which the law deals.
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Pound conceived the law to be a specialized agent of soci~l
controP -in short, the pressure brought to bear up~n. :ach m~ in
order to constrain him to do his part in upholding civilized sO~lety
and to deter him from anti-social conduct-conduct at variance
with the social order (Pound, 1942:210). Here, we see evidence of
both the reification of society and the law. Society is portrayed as
having an independent existence with needs of its o~n quite apart
from or even at variance with, those of some societal members.
The ~ontinuanceof society is then sanctified and th~ law is seen .as
having a special mission in contributing to i~s contmu~ce.Whil,e
the potential of law to exert pressure .IS noted m Pound s
definition of its role, there is little questIon that any pressure
exerted is perceived as legitimate.
Pound did not, however, profess complete affinity between
the law and all interests in society. He was cognizant of the
complexity of societies and recogniz:d the di~erse inter:s.ts .by
which they were characterized. But hIS rheoreucal r~conc~latlon
of diversity was accomplished apart from any ccnsiderations of
differential power. Thus, Pound asserts:
The law is an attempt to satisfy, to reconcile, to hannonize. To
adjust these overlapping and often conflicting claims and demands,
either through securing them directly and immediately or through
compromises of individual interests so as to give effect to the
greatest total of interests or to the interests that we~most in our
civilization, with the least sacrifice to the scheme of interests as a
whole (Pound, 1943:39).
Here we see the law as a reified, neutral, mediative agent in a
pluralistic world. From this perspective, the full satisfaction of
interests is not so important as the fact that the effort towards
satisfaction is made. This effort is the salient feature of. l~gal
institutions in Pound's work. That certain interests are sacn~l~ed
for the sake of others is taken for granted as a necessary con~lt10n
of social order. That some interests may be more fully satisfied
than others posed no problems for Pound.
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Finally, it was his interest in social engineering which led
Pound to urge a partnership between sociology and law.
Sociology, with its scientific methods was to delineate the social
interests of society. With the completion of this task jurists
presumedly were to have the foundation upon which to construct
a legal scheme which would insure that the "maximum satisfaction
of socially worthwhile purposes might be accomplished" (Pound,
1912:491).
It must be stressed that while Pound emphasized the role of
law in social engineering, that engineering was to take place within
well-defined parameters. The desirability of particular forms of
social progress-(e.g., capitalism, industrialism)-was not at issue.
'Neither was law to be used to alter the course of such progress.
Rather, the law was seen as a dependent factor in social life whose
job was the reflection, and maintenance of the society's crucial
values.
In maintaining that the law should be the mediator of
competing interests, Pound (1916) worried about attempts to have
the law enforce or reflect a morality which was not yet commonly
agreed upon. In this, we see again, his belief in law as a dependent
factor in social life. His major concern was that when moral
demands which did not reflect the consensus of the community
were placed upon the law, the efficacy of the law's control would
be diminished.
, In postulating agreement between attitudes and the efficacy
of the law's control, and in worrying lest the law be called upon
for tasks beyond its competence, the limitations of Pound's thesis
are apparent. Most obviously, he fails to' consider instances where
social control is exerted effectively without a corresponding belief,
on the part of the majority, in the morality of law. The limits of
effective legal action may have less to do with the limitations
inherent in law as an institution than they do, for example, in the
inclination of law enforcers or legislators not to enforce the law in
its newly prescribed form. The many instances where law has been
used to affect changes which were at odds with the populace are
conveniently overlooked (see Parks, 1970; Katz, 1968; Chambliss,
1964; Silver, 1967).
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SOCIOLOGteet, APPROACHES
Lest one think that assumptions of the law's legitimacy are
limited to legal theorists, who might be expected to be biased in
their evaluation of it, we need only turn to sociologists for
evidence that such is not the case. In delimiting the sociology of
law, sociologists have established parameters similar to those seen
among sociological jurisprudents.
The sharing of assumptions and errors is best evidenced in the
work of Timascheff who was among the first to attempt the
delimitation of the sociology of law. For Timascheff, "law was a
cultural force whose function was the imposition of norms of
conduct ... on the individual will" (Timascheff, 1937:225). Thus,
Timascheff echoes Pound in his emphasis on law as a form of
social control and he is similar to him as well in reifying the law,
assuming its legitimacy, and divorcing it from any consideration of
power or oppression.
Time has not negated the potency of such assumptions
among sociologists; similar theoretical views continue to be
promulgated. Se1znick (1959), for example, tells us that:
There is no need ... to insist that legal rules be tested by practical
effects ... (because) litde will be gained from further
demonstration that law serves social interescs and that these
interests in turn reflect the changing structure of society (Selznick,
1959:117).
He, of coursevis not alone in his views". Sociological studies oflaw
continue to be marked by an acceptance of the present system of
law as well ashy a consensus as to its necessity for social order
(see Quinney, 1974). Thus, attention is paid to ways in which the
present system .can be improved or made more efficient. Again, we
see the assumption that reform awaits scientific knowledge and
expertise."
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AN ASSESSMENT
The great~st failing of traditional sociological jurisprudence is
that by assumIng a particular reality of law, further inquiry into
the nat~e and rol~ o.f la~ is precluded. The assumptions displayed
are particularly strikmg m that there is so little empirical evidence
to support thern.f
A~ immediate proble~ i~ presented by the assumption that
law W~IC~ evokes con~ormity .IS law which corresponds to general
or SOC.Ial interests. ThIS equatIon of conformity and agreement is
sho~tstg~ted at best. While Pound and Ehrlich and a number of
sOCIOlo~lSts may b: in~ifferent to the existence or importance of
po,:"er in the SOCIal world, societal members (especially those
agamst whom it is directed) are not. As Gerth and Mills have
noted, the motives for conformity to law range from calculations
an~ fear of ~?ssible sanctions to an absolute belief in the justice or
ethical qualities of the law (Gerth and Mills 1953:262) Th I tt
. . ,. e a er
motrvation cannot merely be assumed to be the true one.
The c~nsensus upon which law is supposedly based is
postulated. In an a priori manner and as such appears more
probl~ma:Ic than real. If no consensus is found, or when the one
that IS discovered is less broadly based than one would infer is
necessary to .represent the social interests of the community, then
the assumptton that law cannot exist or be effective unless it
corresponds to general interests becomes less tenable.
The reification of the law poses particular problems. We
learn, for e~~ple, that the law reflects interests or that it is a
neut:aJ. mediative ageJlt. Little ~ffort is made to explicate what the
law IS or who takes part in its construction or administration.
!hus, eviden~e with regard to the shared social class of legal actors
IS seen as an Interesting coincidence rather than as a perhaps telling
commentary about the system.
. With~ut clarification, we are left to conclude that the law has
a life of ItS own. But, since magical forces or mysticism are not
generally accepted as explanations of phenomena of the social
~orld, we must be interested in a delineation of the forces or
Interests which are responsible for the workings of the system.
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Thus, in concluding our assessment of the reality of law
advanced by sociologists and sociological jurisprudents, we must
note the essentially conservative nature of their thought.
Delineating the elements of such thought, Mannheim (1971) has
noted its adherence to concrete situations, its concern with the
immediate without an examination 0"£ the social structure in which
it exists, its tendency to see the present as the finished and
inevitable product of a long process of growth and
concommitantly to guard what is, rather than imagine what might
be.
As should be clear from our discussion, theories of law
exhibit such characteristics. Thus, Ehrlich's insistence on the living
law as the basis upon which positive law must rest and Pound's
fear-expressed in the "Limits of Effective Legal Action"-of
disturbing what already exists are all indicative of conservative
thought. Finally, in taking the present system of law for granted
and in cautioning against change all the theorists we have discussed
display the prime tenets of conservative thought in their work.
ALTERNATIVES
Currently, there is a growing body of theorists and
researchers who have divorced themselves from the predominant
assumptions of the sociology of law. 6 As yet, we do not know
enough about these individuals to speculate whether differences in
social background might account for the new ways in which they
approach the study of law. However, we do know that their work
has developed in a.climate where official.definitions of reality have
come under close scrutiny, leading them to engage in a critical
analysis of law and society. ..
One does not have to fully embrace Marx's notions of law to
recognize that the theories of law we have discussed are
inadequate and incomplete; nor does cne have to be a Marxist to
engage in a critical analysis of law. Instead, one needs only to be
cognizant of the importance of power, economics and politics in
the development of law. As we shall see, when such considerations
guide empirical research, traditional assumptions about law
become less and less tenable.
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Sociologists and sociological jurisprudents have tended to
speak of "the law" as a whole. Because they assumed that law
mediated between and then reflected interests and that all
interested parties were engaged in the expression of such interests,
they ignored the historical development of particular laws. In
addition to ignoring its history, there has been a tendency as well
to divorce the "law" from its everyday workings or from its
enforcement. As such, the "law" remained pure even when law in
everyday life seemed to' act very differently.
When law is approached historically and its study is guided
by considerations of power and economics we find that the
pluralistic assumptions about the nature of its development are no
longer appropriate (Domhoff, 1969; Stern, 1970). We find instead
that all affected groups do not participate in determining the
contents of particular laws (Akers, 1975; Roby, 1969; Kunitz,
1974), and that the development of particular laws as well as
features of the legal system are closely tied to the needs of the
economically dominant classes (Chambliss, 1964; Weinstein, 1968;
Josephson, 1934; Quinney, 1974; Barak, 1975; Platt, 1974;
Serber, 1975).
It appears as well that even those laws which have been
assumed to reflect the general interests of societal members at the
expense of dominant classes have had, upon closer inspection,
different origins than are commonly assumed. They also appear to
work very differently from what one would expect if the
safeguarding of general interests were their intent. Thus, Kolko
(1963) shows that the federal regulation of business, which is
commonly- thought to be ·an example of .the law protecting and
reflecting the general interests of the citizenry, actually served the .-
economic interests of those who were being regulated and that
such legislation was supported by them. Similarly, analysis of
work compensation laws indicates that they were enacted only
after employers recognized that their interests would be served by
such legislation (Friedman & Ladinsky, 1967).
Even when laws are enacted at the protest of dominant
classes this does not necessarily mean that general interests have
prevailed. As Ridgeway has noted with regard to air pollution
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legislation, there is a large gap between the enactment of statutes
and their enforcement (cited in Gordon, 1973). Thus, the presence
of a law may assuage tensions even though it is not enforced. In
cases such as these the ideological aspects of law are most
apparent.
Finally, the issue of crime seriousness appears very different
when it is addressed critically. For example, we have noted that
violent crimes are rated most serious. In considering this finding
Gordon (1973) wonders why it is that some crimes-particularly
those associated with the poor-tend to be violent while others
(e.g., white collar crimes) are not. He notes that the police and
courts pay careful attention to only a few crimes and that, as a
result, those who run the highest risks of arrest and conviction
have to rely on the threat or commission of violence in order to
protect themselves. Thus, he argues that if white collar criminals
were pursued and prosecuted we could expect them to resort to
similar types of behavior. As such, he concludes that "many of the
differences in the degree of violence among different kinds of
crime do not cause the selectivity of public concern about those
crimes but are in fact caused by that selectivity" (emphasis in the
original). As we have seen, explanations of this type, are not even
considered when the tenets of sociological jurisprudence are
assumed to be true.
CONCLUSION
It has often been observed that ways of seeing are also ways
.. .of . not seeing .. The preceding discussion has indicated what
traditional theories and research in the sociology of law have failed
toseeas a result ·of their taken-for-granted assumptions about the
law.
We have seen that when such assumptions are eschewed the
law appears very differently. In short, critical analyses of law have
shown that law does not naturally or neutrally reflect the interests
of the populace-that it is more likely to be determined by and
reflect the interests of the economically dominant classes. As such,
legal change is not dependent upon scientific knowledge and
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expertise. Instead, we have noted the ways in which such
knowledge serves to legitimate the existing order.
Finally, we must again emphasize the importance of situating
studies of law within an historical and economic context if we are
to understand the nature of law as well as its relationship to other
institutions in society.
NOTES
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Boundaries of Legal Sociology," Yale Law Journal 81(May 1972),
pp. 1086-1110 and E. Currie, "The Sociology of Law: The 'Unasked
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BOOK REVIEWS
Mavis Hiltunen Biesang and John Biesang, Introduction to
Sociology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1978.453pp.
This is an introductory text which is based on the premise
that the novice sociological student is new to the discipline and
therefore has no background in the field. No details have been
overlooked by the authors in their efforts to present this material
in an easily assimilated manner.
Among the more outstanding and innovative tactics
employed are a well-indexed table of contents; the red highlighting
of each newly introduced sociological term or phrase (common
usage terms and words which often have a sociological
interpretation are also emphasized in red); and end-of-the-chapter
glossary of new terms and words, and a composite glossary in the
appendix; a cross-referenced index to facilitate the collating of
related ideas; an annotated bibliography, complied on a
chapter-by-chapter basis; a concise, pertinent summary concludes
each chapter; and the easy to read format of the columnar printed
page.
The text answers the student's questions: What is sociology?
What can one do with sociology? How does sociology apply to
me? What does sociology hope to accomplish? These questions are
answered in a forthright manner. It should whet the introductory
student's appetite for further sociological study.
The text is divided into six major sections: The Introduction;
Culture and Socialization; Social Structure; Population and the
Urban' Trend; Social Institutions; and' Social Change. Theorists
may fault the text on the apparent lack of theoretical emphasis,
but in truth, the theory is there, the presentation is simplified, and
made palatable and relevant to life.
The material contained in the text is easily understood; not
at all condescending. The level and coverage of the material, while
intended for the underclassperson, is still pertinent and adaptable
for those students who may be further along in their studies.
